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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
SECURITY DEVICES
Michael H. Rubin*
SURETYSHIP
In 1975 the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth what appeared to
many to be a new rule of law. In Louisiana Bank and Trust Co. v.
Boutte,1 a surety signed a continuing guarantee agreement that con-
tained language making him solidarily liable with the maker of a
note. The creditor released the maker of the note and the other
guarantors, reserving its rights against the defendant, the remain-
ing surety. The court held that the defendant was liable for a por-
tion of the obligation2 because the solidary language of the continu-
ing guarantee agreement gave the creditor a right to treat all of the
sureties as solidary obligors with the debtor. Left open was the
question of what law regulated the rights between the sureties and
the debtor on one hand, and among the sureties on the other.'
Most of the issues not settled by Boutte have now been resolved
in Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land Development Co.' The
facts in Aiavolasiti read like a law school examination question.
There were three separate notes involved. On one note five
shareholders gave continuing guarantees (with solidary language) to
secure the loan made to the corporate defendant. Six shareholders
signed a second note of the corporation as accommodation en-
dorsers. The six shareholders also signed a third note as makers.
The plaintiff, a shareholder who had signed all of the documents and
paid the debt, brought suit against the corporation and his co-
sureties to recover what he had paid.
The court held that, if the debtor and the sureties are bound "in
solido," the creditor is entitled to treat the debtor and sureties as
solidary obligors and to apply the Civil Code articles on solidary
*Special Lecturer of Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge Bar.
1. 309 So. 2d 274 (La. 1975).
2. Whether the defendant's virile share was to be calculated by counting the
maker of the note as one of the virile shares, rather than by counting only the
sureties, was not before the court.
3. The Boutte case has been subject to criticism. See The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Security Devices, 36 LA. L. REV. 437 (1976);
Note, Suretyship-Release of Principal Debtor Does Not Discharge Solidary Surety,
49 TUL. L. REV. 1187 (1975); Note, Rights of the Solidary Surety: Louisiana Bank &
Trust Co. v. Boutte, 36 LA. L. REV. 279 (1975).
4. 371 So. 2d 755 (La. 1979). See Note, Aiavolasiti: A Conflict Resolved, A Con-
flict Ignored, 40 LA. L. REV. 483 (1980).
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obligations; however, even though the sureties are bound "in solido"
with the debtor, as between themselves they remain sureties and
the suretyship provisions of the Civil Code apply inter se.5
Louisiana courts have been inconsistent in ruling which law ap-
plies to accommodation endorsers! Some courts have applied only
the articles under the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL);7 other
courts have applied the Civil Code articles on suretyship8 or the ar-
ticles on solidary obligations.! The matter is not clarified by the
tendency of most lenders to use boiler plate forms providing that
endorsers are liable "in solido" with the makers.
Aiavolasiti was decided under the NIL; the court did not in-
dicate whether the result would be different under articles 1 and 3
of the Uniform Commerical Code (U.C.C.). It is submitted that the
proper approach would be to apply the U.C.C. to accommodation en-
dorsers if the commmercial laws contain an express provision on
point." Only if the problem is not directly dealt with by the commer-
cial laws should the courts look to the Civil Code articles on
suretyship and solidary obligations."
While the Aiavolasiti opinion does clarify many of the questions
raised by the Boutte decision, it may encourage sureties to be
litigious. The supreme court refused to award Mr. Aiavolasiti at-
5. This holding implicitly overrules other decisions that did not use the
suretyship articles to determine contribution between co-sureties bound "in solido"
with the debtor. Whitney Nat'l Bank of New Orleans v. Ben Dev. Co., 364 So. 2d 1076
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Gauthier v. Scott, 327 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
6. Cf. Comment, Suretyship Law and Negotiable Instruments Law: The Liabil-
ity of an Accommodation Party to a Negotiable Instrument in Louisiana, 24 Loy. L.
REV. 251 (1978).
7. See, e.g., Barnes v. Park Place Homes, Inc., 289 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974).
8. See, e.g., C.I.T. Corp. v. Rosenstock, 205 So. 2d 81 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
9. See, e.g., Gisclair v. First Nat'l Bank of Lafayette, 180 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1965).
10. Compare, for example, the rights of an accommodation endorser to contribu-
tion from other endorsers under Revised Statutes 10:3-414(2) with the rights of con-
tribution accorded to sureties under Civil Code article 3058 and to solidary obligors
under Civil Code article 2103.
11. LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974) provides: "Unless displaced by the particular
provisions of this Title, other laws of Louisiana shall apply."
The official comments of the Louisiana State Law Institute following Revised
Statutes 10:1-103 state:
The original U.C.C. text was rejected because it refers to concepts and terms
either unknown to Louisiana or having different meaning in Louisiana. The thrust
of the section is that the rest of Louisiana law implements the commercial law if a
situation is not covered by the commercial law. The Louisiana version says this
without limitations.
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torney's fees and costs because it found that the surety's payment
to the creditor had extinguished the negotiable instruments, thus
relegating his right of recovery to contribution under Civil Code ar-
ticle 3058. This holding will discourage a "solidary surety" who has
any doubts about his co-sureties' willingness to contribute their
virile shares from paying a creditor voluntarily. If the surety who
pays voluntarily must later sue his co-sureties, and if he cannot
recover attorney's fees and interest as provided for in the note, then
the surety will have no motive to pay outside of court. The surety
would be better off refusing to pay voluntarily, waiting to be sued,
and then bringing in his co-sureties as third party defendants.
Fortunately, with the adoption of Louisiana Revised Statutes
10:3:415(5),'" a different result should occur. An accommodation en-
dorser who pays the holder may still pursue the other endorsers
and the maker on the instrument and recover whatever attorney's
fees, costs, and interest the note provides.
PLEDGE AND "ASSIGNMENT"
The drafter of documents is frequently confronted with the prob-
lem of whether to label a proposed security interest a "pledge" or
an "assignment." For historical reasons,'3 and perhaps because of in-
ertia, many practitioners routinely label as "assignments" the
pledge of life insurance, of bank accounts, and of the right to receive
rents under a lease. A true assignment, however, involves a transfer
i of title. If the "assignment" is actually security for a loan, then it is
a security device."
Peoples Bank and Trust Co., Natchitoches v. Harper5 stands as
a reminder that, in security devices as in taxation, substance and
not form controls. The court ruled that an "assignment" of an in-
terest in a savings certificate was, in fact, an attempted pledge and
not a transfer of ownership. Because possession of the certificate
was not transferred, the requirements of pledge were not met and
the creditor's loan was unsecured.
In Associates Financial Services, Inc. v. McClendon," the debtor
executed a document by which he purported to "pledge and/or
12. LA. R.S. 10:3-415(5) (Supp. 1974) provides: "An accommodation party is not
liable to the party accommodated, and if he pays the instrument has a right of
recourse on the instrument against such party." (Emphasis added.)
13. Compare Caffin v. Kirwan, 7 La. Ann. 221 (1832), with LA. R.S. 9:4321-24 (1950
& Supp. 1978), especially LA. R.S. 9:4324, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 703, § 1.
14. Scott v. Corkern, 231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956).
15. 370 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1979).
16. 367 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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assign, transfer, set over and deliver" to a bank monies owing to
him under an employment contract. When the debtor's wages were
then garnished by another creditor the bank claimed priority by vir-
tue of the "assignment." The fourth circuit ruled in favor of the
bank but side-stepped deciding what type of security device was
created. The court found that the bank was entitled to priority
because the contract was "either" a pledge or an assignment.
The court need not have equivocated. There is no such thing as
"pledge and/or assignment"; a contract is either one or the other,
but not both. 7 It was clear from the facts that the document was in-
tended to secure a loan; therefore, it was a pledge.
Three types of movables are susceptible of being pledged: cor-
poreal movables;8 incorporal movables evidenced in writing, the
document itself giving the holder a particular right;' and incor-
poreal movable rights, whether represented by a document or not,
when the document does not give any superior claim to the one who
possesses it.20 An example of this last category would be a lease.
Possession of the contract of lease itself does not confer the right to
collect rent. The rent is due to the person who gives possession of
the property, not to the one who holds the document.2' Similarly, the
right to receive payment for work performed under an employment
contract, as in McClendon, does not belong to the person who
physically holds the employment papers. Although the court did not
set forth all the details of the "assignment," the document in Mc-
Clendon appears to have met all the requirements of a proper
pledge under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4321-24.
The McClendon court also ruled that an employee cannot
"assign" wages under the Accounts Receivable Act.2 The Act,
however, allows one to "assign"
17. Scott v. Corkern, 231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956); Peoples Bank and Trust
Co., Natchitoches v. Harper, 370 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 So. 2d
1330 (La. 1979).
18. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3135 & 3154.
19. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3158 & 3160. An example of this type of document would
be a negotiable instrument. The holder of that document has certain rights simply
because he possesses the instrument.
20. LA. R.S. 9:4321-24 (1950 & Supp. 1978).
21. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2681-82; Spence v. Lucas, 138 La. 763, 70 So. 796 (1916);
Evangeline Ref. Co. v. Nunez, 153 So. 2d 886 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
22. The court stated, without analysis or citation of authority, that the Assign-
ment of Accounts Receivable Act, LA R.S. 9:3101-09 (Supp. 1952 & 1964), "was not in-
tended to include wages earned by the assignor as an employee in the employer's
business or undertaking." 367 So. 2d at 93 (emphasis in original).
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any indebtedness . . .arising out of, or . . . in connection with
any business, profession, occupation, or undertaking. 3
This language seems broad enough to include wages earned by an
employee, for work is surely an employee's "profession" or "occupa-
tion."
ASSIGNMENT OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
Unfortunate dicta was used in Air Compressors, Inc. v. Big
Chief Construction Co." The court indicated, without citing author-
ity or delineating its rationale, that it entertained "considerable
doubt" whether there could be an assignment of future accounts
receivable.
There is nothing in the Act that would prohibit the
"assignment" of future accounts. If the "assignment" is to secure a
debt (i.e., if it is to be a pledge), then the debtor may well want to
be able to secure financing by giving the creditor a security interest
in accounts opened after the loan is made. For example, a retailer
who maintains a large number of open accounts has new customers
every day. It would seem both wasteful and unnecessary to require,
as a condition of securing the loan, that he execute a new "assign-
ment" every time a new account is opened. This is particularly true
in the case of a merchant who may have hundreds of new customers
over the course of a month.
Third parties are not necessarily prejudiced by the
"assignment" of future accounts; in fact, the formal document to be
recorded in the conveyance records must state that the debtor "has
assigned and intends to continue assigning accounts receivable."25
Considering the fact, however, that security rights are stricti
juris, and that civilian theory is inimical to secured rights in
general,"6 the cautious practitioner may wish to avoid assigning
future accounts receivable until the legislature has expressly amended
the Act.
23. LA. R.S. 9:3101(1) (Supp. 1952), as amended by 1964 La. Acts, No. 511, § 1.
24. 367 So. 2d 413 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 369 So. 2d 465 (La. 1979).
In denying writs, the supreme court stated: "While we disagree with the rationale and
reasons assigned by the Court of Appeal in its interpretation of R.S. 9:3101-3109, this
result is correct on the grounds of the facts found by the trial court."
25. LA. R.S. 9:3103 (Supp. 1952).
26. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3183 states: "The property of the debtor is the common
pledge of his creditors, and the proceeds of its sale must be distributed among them
ratably, unless there exist among the creditors some lawful causes of preference.".
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PLEDGE -INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION
Kaplan v. University Lake Corp.2" confirms what most practi-
tioners have understood the law to be. The pledge of a collateral
mortgage note interrupts prescription on the handnote, making it
"virtually imprescriptible"; interruption of prescription continues
even if the collateral mortgage note itself prescribes.
While the Kaplan holding is based on jurisprudential
precedent,28 the rule's rationale is open to attack. The basis of the
rule is that "it is not the contract or act of pledge that interrupts
prescription but rather the detention by the pledgee of the thing
pledged, such possession serving as a constant acknowledgment of
the debt and hence a constant renunciation of prescription."29
If possession by the pledgee "serves as a constant acknowledg-
ment of the debt," it can only be because the pledgor has relinquished
control of something valuable, something he wants returned. The
pledge of a valueless item is useless to the creditor as security for a
loan, for such an item, at a sale, will bring no funds on which the
pledgee may obtain a privilege." Yet, the courts have consistently
ruled that the pledge of items that later become valueless serves to
interrupt prescription on the principal obligation. 1 Blind adherence
to this rule elevates what should be an indicium of a meaningful
pledge of a valuable object to a rubric having an existence all its
own, a precept of value to the creditor even if the pledge is worth-
less. Under the jurisprudence, it is possible for a pledged prescribed
note to interrupt prescription on the principal obligation whether
the pledged note had prescribed after it was pledged, 2 as in Kaplan,
or even if it had prescribed before it was pledged. That the rule
needs reexamination is clear when one contemplates whether the
27. 369 So. 2d 1107 (La. App. 1st Cir.), aff'd, No. 64,328 (La. Oct. 8, 1979) (on
original hearing). Rehearing was granted in part; the case was reargued and resubmit-
ted on Jan. 28, 1980.
28. See, e.g., Succession of Picard, 238 La. 455, 115 So. 2d 817 (1959); Scott v. Cor-
kern, 231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956).
29. Scott v. Corkern, 231 La. 368, 379, 91 So. 2d 569, 573 (1956), quoted with ap-
proval in Kaplan v. University Lake Corp., No. 64,328, slip op. at 4 (La. Oct. 8, 1979)
(on original hearing).
30. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 3157, 3165 (as amended by 1872 La. Acts, No. 9), & 3220.
31. See the cases cited at note 28, supra. Indeed, the court in Kaplan held that
the pledge of a collateral mortgage note (that prescribed while it was in pledge) never-
theless interrupted prescription on the principal obligation.
32. LA. R.S. 9:5807, added by 1970 La. Acts, No. 354, § 1, as amended by 1975 La.
Acts, No. 119 § 1, is specifically designed to keep pledged notes from prescribing if
certain conditions are met.
33. Succession of Picard, 238 La. 455, 115 So. 2d 817 (1959).
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pledge of a dollar bill or a peppercorn would interrupt prescription
on a million dollar debt.34
Perhaps a better approach would be to relegate the aspects of
interruption of prescription to a rule accessory only to the pledge of
a valuable object. If the pledged item ceased to be of value, prescrip-
tion would resume on the principal obligation. The courts could then
decide, on a case-by-case basis, the issue of prescription rather than
allowing an otherwise unsecured creditor (unsecured because his
pledge had ceased to be of value) to maintain an action on an other-
wise prescribed principal obligation.
COLLATERAL MORTGAGES
In First Guaranty Bank v. Alford,35 a husband had borrowed
money from a bank; the loan was represented by a $155,000 prom-
issory note. The wife executed a collateral mortgage note and col-
lateral mortgage on her separate property. She then, by a written
act, pledged her note specifically to secure the $155,000 promissory
note.
The husband paid off the $155,000 promissory note by borrowing
other funds from the bank; eventually, his loan was "rolled over"
several times. During this period the bank maintained possession of
the wife's collateral mortgage note.
When the bank tried to collect on the husband's outstanding in-
debtedness by foreclosing on the wife's collateral mortgage the wife
objected, claiming that the bank had no security interest in her prop-
erty because the husband's original $155,000 promissory note had
been paid off. The supreme court sustained the wife's position.
The court stressed that a collateral mortgage package is, in
essence, a pledge of a promissory note (the "collateral mortgage
note"). The pledged note, in turn, is secured by a mortgage (the col-
lateral mortgage); however, the pledge provisions of the Civil Code
govern whether a creditor is secured.
The court explained that, while a collateral mortgage note may
be pledged to secure future obligations," it also may be pledged to
secure a specific obligation. Determining what obligation the pledge
secures depends upon ascertaining the intent of the parties at the
time the pledge is given. 7 Because the collateral pledge agreement
34. Of course, a court might refuse to extend the interruption of prescription rule
if it determines the sole purpose of the pledge was only to interrupt prescription and
circumvent the prohibition in Civil Code article 3460 against renouncing a prescription
"not yet acquired."
35. 366 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1979).
36. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3158.
37. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3133.
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in Alford showed that the wife's collateral mortgage package was
meant specifically to secure only the husband's original $155,000 prom-
issory note, once that note was paid, the principal obligation was ex-
tinguished and the pledge fell, leaving the bank without a security
interest in either the wife's collateral mortgage note or her col-
lateral mortgage. Because intent plays such an important role in
determining what obligation a collateral mortgage secures, it would
seem advisable for creditors to obtain a written pledge agreement
as part of their standard procedure.38
Mara v. McCoy39 follows the supreme court's ruling in Alford
that a creditor has no right to sue on a pledged collateral mortgage
note when the obligation that the pledge secures has been paid."
Caballero v. Wilkinson 1 involved the pledge of a handnote
(rather than the pledge of a collateral mortgage note).42 Mr. Cerdes
and his wife43 executed two handnotes representing loans from
American Budget Plan, Inc. The loans were secured by the pledge of
the Cerdes' collateral mortgage note and collateral mortgage.
American Budget Plan then pledged one of the Cerdes' handnotes to
another creditor. When American Budget defaulted on its payments,
its creditor attempted to hold the Cerdes liable under the handnote.
The court held that one need not be an owner of a negotiable in-
strument to sue on it; being the holder of "bearer" paper is suffi-
cient. Nevertheless, because the Cerdes had no knowledge of the
pledge by American Budget, and because the Cerdes continued to
pay American Budget, the court found that American Budget was
the agent of the creditor. Therefore, when the Cerdes paid the hand-
note through American Budget, the handnote was extinguished and
the creditor had no right to sue on it. The court was careful to point
out that "this suit is by the holder whose agent received payment.
38. Of course, a written pledge agreement is not always required for the validity
of the pledge. Civil Code article 3158 provides that a pledge of a negotiable instrument
is effective both as between the parties and as to the world merely by delivery.
39. 369 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 So. 2d 835 (La. 1979).
40. To the same effect see Guitreau v. Kinchen, 361 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1978).
41. 367 So. 2d 349 (La. 1979).
42. A collateral mortgage package consists of the note paraphed for identification
with the collateral mortgage (the so-called "Ne Varietur" or collateral mortgage note);
the collateral mortgage itself; and the handnote, the principal obligation which the
pledge of the collateral mortgage note secures. First Guar. Bank v. Alford, 366 So. 2d
at 1302. See also Nathan & Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage, 33 LA. L. REV. 497
(1973); Nathan & Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage: A Reassessment and Postscript,
36 LA. L. REV. 973 (1976).
43. The defendants were "Flora Wilkinson, wife of and Julius W. Cerdes."
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It is not a suit by a holder who has not received payment directly
nor through an agent.",
The issue of how much the holder of a collateral mortgage note
may collect upon foreclosure was before the first circuit in Central
Progressive Bank v. Doerner 5 The Doerners executed a collateral
mortgage note in the amount of $10,500 and pledged it as security
for a $17,472 handnote. They defaulted on their payments on the
handnote, and the property brought $18,600 at the sheriff's sale.
Central Progressive Bank (the holder of the handnote) claimed it
was entitled, as a secured creditor, to the balance due on the hand-
note, although the balance due was in excess of the $10,500 col-
lateral mortgage note. Cumberland Capital Corporation, the holder
of a second mortgage on the property, intervened and asserted that
it was entitled to any funds realized from the sale of the property in
excess of the amount of the collateral mortgage note. The court sus-
tained Cumberland's position, ruling that, from the sale's proceeds,
the holder of the collateral mortgage note could collect as a secured
creditor only the amount of the collateral mortgage note since that
was less than the balance due on the handnote.
This analysis is sound. As the supreme court recognized in
Alford," a collateral mortgage is, in essence, a pledge of a prom-
issory note. The rights of a pledgee should be the same regardless
of the type of movable pledged. For example, assume X pledges his
watch to Y to secure a loan of $100. If X defaults and Y sells the
pledgor's watch, Y may not collect more than the $100 owing to him;
any funds in excess of the debt must be returned to the pledgor.'7 If
the watch sells for only $50, however, Y is entitled to keep the full
amount and is an unsecured creditor of the balance owing to him.
The same rationale should apply to a collateral mortgage
package. The creditor is able to sell the mortgaged property only
because he holds the collateral mortgage note in pledge. The col-
lateral mortgage note, being a demand note, can be enforced by the
creditor. 8 In enforcing his rights against the collateral mortgage
note, the creditor is entitled to seize and sell the property that
secures the collateral mortgage note, to apply the proceeds of the
property's sale to the collateral mortgage note, and to apply the
44. 367 So. 2d at 352.
45. 365 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
46. 366 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1979).
47. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3166 & 3170.
48. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3170 provides: "If the credit which has been given in pledge
becomes due before it is redeemed by the person pawning it, the creditor, by virtue of
the transfer which has been made to him, shall be justified in receiving the amount,
and in taking measures to recover it ...."
[Vol. 40
19801 WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1978-1979 581
amounts received on the collateral mortgage note to the payment of
the principal indebtedness (i.e., the handnote). Therefore, as Doerner
held, once the proceeds from the sale of the property equal the
amount of the collateral mortgage note, the creditor is no longer
secured; the surplus over the amount of the collateral mortgage
note must go first to other secured creditors of the property, if any,
with the remainder being remitted to the pledgor.
There are three possible variations on the situation posed in
Doerner:
(1) $17,000 handnote; $10,000 collateral mortgage note; prop-
erty sells for $18,000."1 In this situation, because the col-
lateral mortgage note is less than the outstanding balance
on the handnote, the holder of the handnote is unsecured
for any sum in excess of the amount of the collateral mort-
gage note, and the surplus funds go to secondary mortgage
holders on the property (or, if there are none, to the owner
of the property). This is precisely the holding of Doerner.
(2) $17,000 handnote; $10,000 collateral mortgage note; prop-
erty sells for $5,000. The holder of the handnote should re-
ceive the entire $5,000 because it is less than both the out-
standing balance on the handnote and the amount of the col-
lateral mortgage note.
(3) $10,000 handnote; $17,000 collateral mortgage note; prop-
erty sells for $18,000. In this situation, the creditor can
collect only the amount of the handnote ($10,000) because
that is the extent of the principal indebtedness due him. He
is not entitled to receive any additional amounts, either on
a secured or unsecured basis, because the obligation is now
extinguished."0
Therefore, it would appear that, in a collateral mortgage situa-
tion, the creditor is entitled to collect as a secured creditor from the
proceeds of the sale the lesser of the amount of (1) the handnote or
(2) the collateral mortgage note." Of course, to the extent that there
is a deficiency left on the handnote, the creditor would have a per-
sonal right of action against the debtor.
49. These are not the exact sums at issue in Doerner, but the numbers are easier
to use rounded off than $17,472, $10,500, and $18,600.
50. "Louisiana Civil Code Article 3170 permits the mortgagee to collect the full
amount of the pledged mortgage note, subject to an accounting to the debtor for an ex-
cess over and above the actual indebtedness. Allen v. Commercial National Bank in
Shreveport, 138 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962)." Fuller v. Underwood, 355 So. 2d
62, 64 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 1153 (La. 1978).
51. Cf. Nathan & Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage: A Reassessment and
Postscript, 36 LA. L. REV. 973 (1976).
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In none of the three situations posited above is it necessary to
decide explicitly whether there is personal liability on the collateral
mortgage note because one person is the maker of both the hand-
note and the collateral mortgage note. What would be the result,
however, if the collateral mortgage note were pledged to secure the
obligation of a third party? Assume P is indebted to Q for $17,000. R
pledges a $10,000 collateral mortgage note, secured by a collateral
mortgage, to Q as security for P's debt. Further assume P defaults
and Q forecloses on R's property which brings $5,000 at a sheriff's
sale. Can creditor Q continue to pursue R personally for the remain-
ing $5,000 deficiency on the collateral mortgage note itself?
The suggestion that there may be personal liability on the col-
lateral mortgage note raises the spectre, in some practitioners'
minds, of potential double liability on the part of the maker of the
two notes. It is submitted that there is no double liability, but that,
nevertheless, when a person executes a collateral mortgage note, he
does undertake personal liability on that note itself.2
The maker of a handnote secured by the pledge of a collateral
mortgage package need not fear double liability. A creditor who
holds an item (such as a collateral mortgage note) in pledge cannot
collect an amount in excess of the principal obligation.53 To reiterate,
the creditor is entitled to collect (as a secured creditor) only the
lesser amount of either (1) the outstanding balance on the handnote
or (2) the amount of the collateral mortgage note." Paraphing a note
for identification with an act of collateral mortgage does not alter
the fact that it is a negotiable instrument. It remains a personal
obligation of the maker enforceable by any holder.5 The personal
liability of the maker of the collateral mortgage note is a necessity
because a mortgage is an accessory obligation." A mortgage cannot
stand "by itself." If the collateral mortgage note imparted no per-
52. The author hopes his views are not influenced by the fact that he is counsel
for creditors in several lawsuits in which this position is being taken.
53. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3170 & 3172. Cf. Steeg v. Codifer, 157 La. 298, 102 So. 407
(1924).
54. Likewise, the maker of a collateral mortgage note need not fear double liabil-
ity if the holder transfers it to a third person without the maker's knowledge or con-
sent. If the collateral mortgage note is "sold" without transferring the handnote or the
principal obligation, then "a sale of collateral divorced from the debt it is pledged to
secure would amount to a conversion." Odom v. Cherokee Park Homes, Inc., 165 So. 2d
855, 864 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). Furthermore, because the collateral mortgage note
would contain a paraph indicating it was identified with an act of collateral mortgage,
any person who took the note apart from a transfer of the handnote would be put on
notice of a possible claim or defense and could not be a holder in due course. LA. R.S.
10:3-302(1)(c) (Supp. 1974).
55. LA. R.S. 10:3-301 & 3-413(1) (Supp. 1974).
56. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3278 & 3284.
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sonal liability to its maker, the mortgage would secure nothing and
would fall of its own weight."
The collateral mortgage package is not an in rem obligation, and
the creditor's rights should not be restricted to the amount the mort-
gaged property brings at a sheriff's sale. To hold that a collateral
mortgage note creates no personal liability for the maker, to hold
that, in essence, it is an "in rem" mortgage, would have serious ef-
fects on commerical transactions in Louisiana. First, it would re-
quire overruling a series of cases that have enforced mortgages and
collateral mortgages pledged by one person to secure the debt of
another. 8 Second, it would alter the usual and customary concept of
"in rem" mortgages. 9 Third, it would mean that a collateral mort-
gage note is non-negotiable. 0 For these reasons it is submitted that
a collateral mortgage note does impose personal liability on the
maker, and, in answer to the hypothetical posed above, Q may con-
tinue to pursue R personally for the remaining deficiency.
THE PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE
To say that a person is not affected by any interest in im-
movable property unless something is recorded in the parish mort-
gage or conveyance records is to misconstrue the public records doc-
57. Cf Bernheim v. Pessou, 143 La. 609, 79 So. 23 (1918). In Bernheim the creditor
released the debtor from personal liability on a note; the court held that the mortgage
was unenforceable.
58. See, e.g., Rex Finance Co. v. Cary, 244 La. 675, 154 So. 2d 360 (1963); Jennings
v. Vickers, 31 La. Ann. 679 (1879); Baker Bank and Trust Co. v. Behrnes, 217 So. 2d
461 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
59. Cf. Tennent v. Caffry, 170 La. 680, 129 So. 128 (1930). See also Nathan, The
"In Rem" Mortgage, 44 TUL. L. REV. 497 (1970). .
60. To be negotiable, an instrument must contain an "unconditional promise" to
pay a sum certain in money. LA. R.S. 10:3-104(1)(b) (Supp. 1974). To the extent that
recovery on a note is limited to a particular fund, or is limited to the value of a par-
ticular tract of property, the promise is not unconditional and the note is not
negotiable. LA. R.S. 10:3-105(2)(b) (Supp. 1974). Such a note, being non-negotiable, could
not be transferred by mere delivery; authentic evidence of the transfer would be
necessary in order to bring about executory proceedings. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts.
2636-37; Louisiana Nat'l Bank of Baton Rouge v. Heroman, 280 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 281 So. 2d 755 (La. 1973). A requirement of authentic evidence of
transfer would effectively destroy the utility of collateral mortgages, because the col-
lateral mortgage note is always phrased in terms of "bearer" paper precisely because
any holder may enforce it by executory proceedings without further evidence of how
he became the holder. Slidell Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. IDS Mortgage Corp., 273 So. 2d 343
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 274 So. 2d 708 (La. 1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Gad-
dis, 250 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Allen v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 138 So. 2d
253 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). Cf. Thrift Funds Canal, Inc. v. Foy, 261 La. 573, 578, 260
So. 2d 628, 630 (1972).
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trine. 1 There is no need to record a document on the public records
to affect either the parties to the document or those who are not ex-
pressly considered "third persons" within the meaning of Civil Code
articles 3342-44 and Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2722.
In King v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co.,6" the court held that a
bank could not take the position of a "third party" and rely on the
public records to enforce a mortgage against the record owner of
property when the bank's attorney had acted as notary for the act
of sale to the record owner and was aware that: (a) there was a
counter letter between the buyer and the sellers; (b) the purpose of
the sale was to allow the buyer to obtain financing for a home he
was building on the lot for the sellers; (c) the property was to be
transferred back to the sellers as soon as financing was obtained
and the house constructed; and (d) the sellers would not have
entered into the act of sale had they known that the buyer would
mortgage the property for his other debts.
LaCour v. Crais"3 applied the public records doctrine to protect
the purchaser from the claims of a creditor who contended that his
mortgage had been released fraudently. The holding is limited to its
facts, the court finding that the creditor had intended that some prop-
erty would be released from the mortgage and, through its own
negligence, had failed to discover the allegedly fraudulent release of
the property at issue.
JUDICIAL MORTGAGES
Credit Service Corp. v. Bagley held that "with respect to the
debtors' homestead ... a lien on the property, created by the recor-
dation of a judgment at a time when the judgment debtor is insol-
vent within four months of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy,
may be cancelled by a state court upon the petition and proper
showing by the judgment debtor who is personally discharged of the
debt in the bankruptcy proceedings." 4
RANKING CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND PRIVILEGES
Arenson International, Inc. v. Shelving Systems Corp.5 involved
61. LA. R.S. 9:2721-24 (1950); McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1910).
For further clarification of some of the misconceptions of the public records doctrine,
see Redmann, The Louisiana Law of Recordation: Some Principles and Problems, 39
TUL. L. REV. 491 (1965).
62. 371 So. 2d 257 (La. 1979).
63. 367 So. 2d 1203 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 369 So. 2d 141 (La. 1979).
64. 364 So. 2d 624, 627 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
65. 369 So. 2d 1212 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
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a ranking problem between a chattel mortgagee and the holder of a
vendor's privilege. The chattel mortgage was for inventory kept at a
warehouse at a particular location. The chattel mortgage was
recorded prior to the sale of office furniture by the vendor. The
chattel mortgagee claimed that he outranked the vendor under the
theory that a chattel mortgage outranked all subsequently arising
privileges.6
The first issue faced by the court was whether the chattel mort-
gage applied at all to office furniture when the mortgage was on "all
the masses or assemblages of inventory" of a shelving company. The
court found it did, even though furniture was not shelving; the office
furniture was "inventory" kept at the location described.
The second issue was whether the chattel mortgage arose at the
time of filing or at some later date. Reasoning that an inventory
chattel mortgage cannot arise until the goods are actually at the
location indicated, the court found that the chattel mortgage did not
affect third parties until the concurrence of both filing and the ar-
rival of the goods on the premises. Because the vendor's privilege
arose at the moment of the perfection of sale and prior to delivery
to the warehouse, the vendor's privilege outranked the chattel mort-
gage.
For the court to have held otherwise would have opened the
door for unscrupulous creditors to gain security interests not intended
by the parties or by law. For example, assume that the holder of an
inventory chattel mortgage discovers that the debtor is in financial
straits. The creditor might attempt to move all of the debtor's mer-
chandise into the warehouse in order to defeat the rights of ven-
dors or of those holding later recorded (non-inventory) chattel mort-
gages on specific floor merchandise, even though this merchandise
was not originally intended to be placed in the warehouse. This
could lead to an unseemly "race to the warehouse."
The court's reasoning should extend to all forms of chattel mort-
gages and not be limited only to those on inventory. The vendor's
privilege arises at the moment of sale, and that is at the concur-
rence of the thing, price, and consent.67 It would appear that, when
the buyer becomes owner of the property, it is already encumbered
by a vendor's privilege. The chattel mortgagee should take the
buyer's title as he found it, ie., subject to the vendor's privilege.
66. LA. R.S. 9:5354 (1950 & Supp. 1954), a8 amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 572,
§ 2.
67. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2439.
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RANKING FEDERAL LIENS WITH STATE SECURITY INTERESTS
Federal law is preemptive in the area of federal tax liens, and
federal law determines the ranking of these liens. 8 Whether a
separate federal common law applies to non-tax liens was addressed
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Kimball
Foods, Inc. 9 Specifically dealing with SBA and FHA loan programs,
the Court held that, while federal law determines whether the
federal lien exists at all, state law determines the ranking of the
liens as against state-created security interests. Although the
Court's opinion is specifically limited to FHA and SBA loan pro-
grams, its rationale appears broad enough to encompass any consen-
sual programs by which "the United States acts as a lender or
guarantor.1
70
PRIVATE WORKS ACT
The Private Works Act71 is not a model of clarity in legislative
drafting. Lambert Brothers, Inc. v. Ziegler"2 involves a materialman
who had timely filed his affidavit in the public records but who had
not timely mailed a copy of the claim to the owner by registered
mail. The court held that timely mailing of the claim to the owner is
not a prerequisite for obtaining the lien; the materialman was
granted his privilege. The court indicated, in dicta, that mailing a
copy of the affidavit to the owner is a "prerequisite only to the
owner's personal liability."78
Sam Marrs Equipment Co. v. C. & J. Painting and Sandblasting
Co.7" is one of the few cases to interpret the privilege on immovables
that the Private Works Act grants to lessors when leased movables
are used on the site.75 The evidence being inconclusive, the court
upheld the lessor's privilege on the basis that there is a strong
presumption that property, once located on the premises, is actually
being used. The court rejected the landlord's pleas of estoppel and
waiver, indicating that, had the landowner wished to prevent the
68. See I.R.C. §§ 6321-25 (which includes the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub.
L. No. 94-455, 80 Stat. 1125 (amending I.R.C. § 6323)); Capital Say. Ass'n v. Runnels,
361 So. 2d 458 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
69. 99 S. Ct. 1448 (1979).
70. Id. at 1462.
71. LA. R.S. 9:4801-21 (1950 & Supp. 1976).
72. 361 So. 2d 948 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 121 (La. 1978).
73. Id at 951.
74. 365 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
75. LA. R.S. 9:4801.1 (Supp. 1975).
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lien from attaching, he should have followed the procedure set forth
in the statute .
7
PUBLIC WORKS ACT
Slagle-Johnson Lumber, Inc. v. Landis Construction Co. 71 con-
tinued the narrow jurisprudential interpretation of the Public
Works Act M and refused to grant a lien to a supplier of materials
that were not directly incorporated into the work.79 The court held
that, unless materials are actually incorporated into the construction
or "directly consumed" by the work (like dynamite)," they do not fall
within the scope of the Act. Writs have been granted. 1
76. LA. R.S. 9:4801.1 (Supp. 1975).
77. 366 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
78. LA. R.S. 38:2241-48 (1950).
79. The materials consisted of plywood, lumber, and nails used to build forms for
concrete and steel.
80. See Long Bell Lumber Co. v. S.D. Carr Constr. Co., 172 La. 182, 133 So. 438
(1931).
81. 367 So. 2d 379 (La. 1979).
